The Secularism of Music Studies by Sykes, Jim
Yale Journal of Music & Religion 
Volume 6 
Number 2 Sound and Secularity Article 8 
2020 
The Secularism of Music Studies 
Jim Sykes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/yjmr 
Recommended Citation 
Sykes, Jim (2020) "The Secularism of Music Studies," Yale Journal of Music & Religion: Vol. 6: No. 2, 
Article 8. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17132/2377-231X.1210 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale Journal of Music & Religion by an authorized editor of EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
119Yale Journal of Music & Religion Vol. 6, No. 2 (2020)
The Secularism of Music Studies
Jim Sykes
Why does power need glory? If it is essentially force and capacity for 
action and government, why does it assume the rigid, cumbersome, and 
“glorious” form of ceremonies, acclamations, and protocols? What is the 
relation between economy and Glory?
—Giorgio Agamben1
Political Theology and Formations of 
Music History
In his book The Kingdom and the Glory, 
Giorgio Agamben reconsiders Carl Schmitt’s 
famous thesis that “all significant concepts 
of the modern theory of the state are 
secularized theological concepts.”2 Schmitt, 
a committed Nazi, sought (as Carl Raschke 
puts it) “to revalidate somehow the pre-
modern assumption that political absolutism 
had its own kind of legitimacy, if it had 
the warrant of religious transcendence.”3 
Agamben argues that there is in fact a second 
paradigm of sovereignty also operative in 
early Christian political theology, the “divine 
economy” or oikonomia (“an immanent 
ordering—domestic and not political in 
a strict sense—of both divine and human 
life”).4 To stick with Raschke’s summary of 
Agamben a bit longer, he suggests that the 
origins of the second paradigm lie “in Jesus’ 
proclamation of the ‘kingdom of God’”:
On the one hand, “kingdom” 
(basileia) signifies unconditioned 
divine sovereignty, but as the Great 
Commandment implies, and Jesus’ 
own radically relational interpretation 
of what it means to be a participant in 
the “kingdom,” it also connotes limitless 
mutual obligations that we have to each 
other, a form of a familialism reaching 
infinitely beyond the limits of blood, 
kinship, and any particular, concrete 
“household.” It was under the influence of 
Christianity and the writings of Saint Paul 
that the classical notion of dike morphed 
into the broader, “cosmopolitan” ideal of 
what nowadays we term social justice.5
Trinitarian doctrine sought to resolve 
how God could be complete, infinite, and 
pure while existing on earth in limited 
and material form.6 Here is Hippolytus’s 
description of this (as summarized by 
Watkin):
The Father is one, but he is two persons, 
Father and Son, and then there is 
a third, the Holy Spirit. The third 
mediates between Father and Son, first 
in that the Father gives orders which 
are performed by the logos revealed in 
the Son. Then the Son, through belief, 
is accorded to the Father as the one 
who performs the Father’s will. In other 
words economy, the Holy Spirit, is a 
doubly mediating articulation that does 
not actually reconcile Trinitarian and 
Gnostic theology but solves the age-
old theological problem of how God’s 
will is actuated on the earth without 
undermining all the elements of God’s 
power, such as omniscience, atemporality, 
the will of good resulting in the existence 
of evil etc.7
The heavenly army of bureaucrats—that is, 
the angels and clergy—act to dispensate, 
manage, and produce the glorification of God, 
making humans aware of his providence, 
leading ultimately to their redemption 
in the kingdom of heaven. The central 
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observation of Agamben’s book is that 
“the apparatus of the Trinitarian oikonomia 
may constitute a privileged laboratory 
for the observation of the working and 
articulation . . . of the governmental 
machine” because it shows modern 
sovereign power in its “paradigmatic form.”8 
What Agamben finds in each era is an 
“empty throne” whose power is dispersed, 
managed, and legitimized through glory to 
produce consensus. He likens the economy 
of salvation to the modern media’s ability 
to produce and retract glory in secular 
democracies (“the acclamative and 
doxological aspect of power that seemed to 
have disappeared in modernity”).9 
In a stunning argument that should 
give music scholars pause, Agamben 
locates music at the very center of the 
early Christian oikonomia. This is because 
music is central to the production of glory 
that is bestowed upon the sovereign by 
liturgy, ceremonies, and acclamations, 
the purpose of which is to “cover with 
its splendour the unaccountable figure 
of divine inoperativity.”10 Glory fills the 
“unthinkable emptiness” left in the wake 
of divine inoperativity (i.e., the empty 
throne), but in so doing, it is also what 
“nourishes and feeds power (or, rather, 
what the machine of power transforms 
into nourishment).”11 Thus, Agamben 
asks, “what is a politics that would not be 
of government but of liturgy, not of action 
but of hymn, not of power but of glory?”12 
The empty throne of the sovereign who 
is glorified through the divine economy 
that acts on his behalf to redeem humans 
is fully revealed as inoperative after 
redemption, when what will remain is “a 
hymnological hierarchy”: the angels, “left 
without act or praxis as God’s will has been 
completed so that he is, yet again, pure 
Being without any further act, represent 
through their songs of praise, God’s 
inoperativity (he no longer needs to act on 
earth).”13 Note the causal power of music 
in this production of sovereignty—music 
acts to provide “cover” for the sovereign’s 
inoperativity—yet note also that Agamben 
does not perceive music as doing anything 
to humans, society, or God here, since 
music-as-glory is revealed in the end 
merely to represent divine inoperativity.
(Notice the dichotomies in Agamben’s 
phrase “not of action but of hymn, not of 
power but of glory.”) Paradoxically, music 
in this conception lies at the center of the 
oikonomia but is noneconomic, without 
action and without power.
“Inoperativity as the dimension most 
proper to God and man” reaches its 
apotheosis in the Jewish Sabbath and 
Christian Sunday, when all work ceases.14 
To my ears, the celebration of rest—which 
in churches and synagogues has long 
featured uses of song to glorify God—is 
the origin of Western society’s notions of 
music as transcendence, epiphenomenon, 
and an alternative to normative labor. 
Musicological scholarship has often located 
these concepts in the emergence of the 
Western classical canon in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, but the value of 
Agamben’s text is not just that he shows 
how going back to early Christian political 
theology allows us to grasp their Christian 
origins. Rather, it is that he demonstrates 
the signal importance of music-as-glory, 
music-as-non-normative labor, and music-
as-noneconomy to Christian tradition, 
concepts that (I strive to show in this essay) 
become firmly integrated into the modern 
Western ontology of music in secular form 
but have been much less discussed by 
music scholars than the historicization of 
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transcendence and the musical works that 
(I contend) derive from them.15
At this juncture, I want to question 
whether Agamben is not taking a modern 
view of music and projecting it onto early 
Christian political theology—for surely the 
role of music in early Christian theology is 
more complex than he makes it out to be. 
Music’s role throughout diverse Christian 
theologies today is emotive, redemptive, 
salvific: music transforms the interior 
state of a person. For the early church 
fathers, though, music’s value lay in large 
part in the sense of unity that monophonic 
choral singing facilitated, conceived as a 
mimicking of the angelic choirs.16 Music 
was granted as a concession to human 
weakness, since God does not need singing—
perhaps music, then, was “nourishment” 
more for people than for divine sovereign 
power.17 The value of music-as-glory lay, I 
suggest, not so much in its legitimization of 
God’s power but in the spiritual discipline 
it facilitated for worshippers: music in 
this conception moves to the sovereign as 
glory, but it also points from the angels to 
the individual who pours open their soul 
within the social unit of the choir, offering 
“one’s whole spirit as incense.”18 
I suggest music was a critical part of 
the early Christian economy of salvation 
(and not just a representation of divine 
inoperativity) in at least one other sense. In 
virtue of music’s role as a smokescreen for 
divine inoperativity that is conceived as a 
representation of angels’ hymnody (labor 
conceptualized as nonlabor), it actively 
shapes the oikonomia itself: this is because 
music works toward redemption by doing 
away with divisions between humans 
(ethnic, national, cultural, gendered, etc.) 
in a way that presumes Christianity’s 
universality but is hierarchical since it places 
those who are not Christian on the outside. 
Consider the political theologist Shane 
Akerman’s statement that
the sacred liturgy is . . . not only a 
public act of the Church, but also one 
that sets itself in opposition to the 
narrowly nationalistic public space of 
the state. As one moves up the vertical 
axis, participating more profoundly in 
the worship of the angels, then one’s 
horizontal reach is also widened. All of 
creation is called inward and upward in 
the participation of the worship of the 
triune God.19
The German theologian Erik Peterson 
describes this ontology of musical 
salvation in terms that would horrify any 
ethnomusicologist: “every type of ethnic 
singing, folk music, and national anthem 
eventually succumbs to its inevitable 
decline.”20 The result is that “it is worship 
that predates governmentality and worship 
that will outlast it.”21 God is eternal 
while cultural practices and governance, 
giving rise to difference and violence, are 
transitory and ultimately superseded: 
“the government is nothing but the brief 
interval running between the two eternal 
and glorious figures of the Kingdom.”22 
This veneer of music-as-inclusive-inaction 
diverts attention from its active exclusion 
of those who think otherwise.23 
We might ask why Agamben takes the 
early Christian presentation of liturgy 
as laborless and powerless at face value, 
viewing only what music does inwardly (it 
is a smokescreen for divine inoperativity) 
rather than outwardly (it excludes through 
its ideology of inclusion). The reason, I 
contend, is that our modern ontology of 
music carries forward these notions of 
music-as-glory, music-as-non-normative 
labor, and music-as-representation from 
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early Christian political theology. This 
makes it difficult for thinkers who have 
grown up in that tradition to analyze 
music outside of its concepts (this is why 
many keen musical listeners and thinkers 
can read the phrase “not of action but of 
hymn” without batting an eye). It becomes 
difficult to see what music is doing to Others 
through a framework that assumes music 
doesn’t do anything to Others. Or, to put 
this another way, the ontology positions 
music as having a community-forming 
capacity through the idea that music, which 
does not really do anything but bestow 
glory and serve as an antidote to normative 
labor, can be a way for a community to 
understand itself.24 Music’s ability to divide 
one community from another, its ability to 
connect to Others outside a community, 
its ability to be a form of mundane and 
everyday labor, its way of relating directly 
to nonhuman animals and God(s), its 
efficacious powers to plea with and cajole 
the divine—these and similar concepts 
(widespread outside Abrahamic religions) 
are expressly avoided in the Christian 
paradigm that (as Agamben demonstrates, 
albeit accidentally) undergirds many 
modern assumptions about what music is 
and how to think about it.
Secular Resonance
In this essay, I provide a framework for 
registering the enduring presence, if not 
dominance, of concepts from early Christian 
political theology—music-as-glory, music-
as-noneconomy, music-as-non-normative 
labor, music-as-representation, and music-
as-salvation—in the secular methodologies 
of music studies.25 I propose (1) that 
Agamben’s analysis demonstrates the 
widespread tendency for Western scholars 
to recursively use concepts from the early 
Christian ontology of music, personhood, 
and devotion in secular form to analyze 
those concepts’ development in Western 
history (as well as musics that developed 
outside Christian influence). I call this 
tendency “secular resonance” and contend 
it has shaped music studies—indeed, much 
of music history around the globe—in its 
(in His?) image. The notion that music’s 
primary function, given its presumed 
“inaction,” is to form community and 
bestow glory upon it or individuals, 
especially through festivity (as a presumed 
break from normative labor) and through 
music’s ability to serve as a representation 
of a community’s beliefs, has a Christian 
(perhaps more specifically, a Protestant) 
heritage.26 To be clear, my aim here is not 
to call out scholars who inadvertently use 
this Christian-derived ontology when it is 
inappropriate to do so, but rather to gain 
a basic understanding of how it came to 
shape (and continues to shape) formations 
of music globally and in music scholarship 
(including ethnomusicology) through the 
process I call secular resonance. (2) I argue 
that secular resonance, in taking music’s 
representational capacities at face value—in 
presuming the legitimacy of music-as-non-
normative labor that builds community 
through its capacity for a shared experience 
of salvation—has long obscured music’s 
function as an economy in the structuring, 
hierarchical, familial, and political sense 
(oikonomia), including between humans 
and nonhumans, and between humans 
belonging to different communities.27 (3) 
I contend that in secular modernity, music-
as-glory became redirected away from 
God, but the early Christian theological 
conceptualization of music—expanded 
via Protestant-influenced secularism to 
include a community’s supposed emerging 
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in “private reason”28 via a “scene” defined 
by symbols that represent and mediate 
musicians’ and listeners’ actions—remains 
marshaled (such as through the culture 
concept) as an inclusive methodology that 
excludes through its transformation of 
difference.29
In celestial mechanics, “secular resonance” 
describes a type of orbital resonance 
in which the rotation (or “precession”) 
of a celestial body gradually becomes 
synchronized with a larger body, typically a 
planet, over a duration of a million years or 
more.30 This use of “secular,” pertaining to 
“characteristics that change slowly over time,” 
derives from an old definition of secular as “a 
long duration” that was once widespread in 
scientific fields from economics to geology. 
It is from the late Latin saecularis (“worldly, 
pertaining to a generation or age”),31 which, 
as Charles Taylor and many others have 
shown, developed into “secularism” through 
the medieval European notion of secular as 
“worldly” activities not considered sacred.32 
I use the term “secular resonance” here 
in the first sense above: it is a process 
of slowly bringing the sounds of Others 
into the orbit of the Christian ontology of 
music, even when the latter has been firmly 
secularized, through an influence that is 
barely if at all noticeable. Music-as-glory 
and music-as-salvation, I suggest, double 
themselves in terminology like “music and 
nationalism” and “music and ethnicity,” 
slowly transforming musical difference 
into Christianity’s likeness.33 Marilyn 
Strathern calls this “the duplicate”: when 
we demarcate the concept “knowledge,” for 
example, it produces knowledge; through 
such doubling, concepts come to occupy 
“both an object position and subject position 
in relation to itself ” and thus “subject and 
object cocreate one another.”34 In music 
studies, “the question as to what constitutes 
knowledge is going to be intimately bound 
up with the question as to what constitutes 
relations.”35 This is not just because we 
investigate the relations between people and 
their music, nor because we must consider 
ourselves as researchers in relation to the 
people and musics we study. If we frame our 
methods only in these ways, we are already 
performing secular resonance since we will 
leave out relations between (say) people 
and their neighbors, God(s), nonhuman 
animals, plants, ritual objects, and the like—
all of whom/which have been shown to 
be relevant (if not generative) for musical 
actions the world over—while assuming 
that music functions as a representation 
and expression of the interior state of the 
peoples who made it. What needs to be a 
focal point of scholarship is how those who 
think otherwise have engaged this Western 
conception of music-as-nonrelation (music 
defines who is on the inside of a boundary, not 
how those within a boundary relate to those 
outside), music-as-noneconomy (music is 
an expression of an interior state, not an 
action that produces personhood through 
exterior relations with Others), and music-
as-nonlabor (music is a way to blow off 
steam, as entertainment and/or devotion). 
This can be achieved only by avoiding our 
own imposition of the Christianized secular 
ontology of music in our documentation 
of the otherwise. By “secular resonance,” 
then, I mean the process through which our 
musicological vocabulary doubles itself to 
eliminate the types of relations from music 
history that contradict Christian political 
theology’s ontology of music and its myriad 
doublings (through the ages) that have come 
to shape music studies. The legacy of secular 
resonance, I suggest, has been: (1) a decline 
of music’s social power (“not of action but of 
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hymn, not of power but of glory”); (2) the 
sedimentation of a notion of musical labor 
as non-normative that affects musicians’ 
livelihoods (sometimes positively, though 
more often, I suggest, negatively); and 
(3) an enormous transformation in global 
conceptions of “musicianhood” that mimic 
early Christianity’s eradication of pagan 
ontologies of music.36 To be clear, I am not 
making the endlessly repeated suggestion 
that scholars need to better place music in 
its social context. Rather, I am making the 
claim that when we do so, we tend to utilize 
conceptions of music and personhood 
derived from an early Christian political 
absolutism that ignores the potential for 
the second paradigm of Christian theology 
to reach outside itself and wind down our 
secularized, Christian-derived exclusionism, 
the result of which would accord more 
closely with what Raschke calls (above) 
“social justice.”
Ancient Christian Musics:   
“Drastic or Gnostic?”
I turn now to addressing the yawning gap 
between those who study European musics 
from the medieval era to the present and 
those who study musics of the ancient 
world (mainly classicists). For what lies 
between is the historical transition to 
Christian hegemony articulated by the 
church fathers. Nowhere has the Christian 
theological paradigm of music been 
more pronounced in silencing musical 
difference—nowhere has our secular 
resonance been more prolonged and 
powerful—than in the near-total erasure 
of “pagan” (ancient Greek and Roman) 
musics from Anglo-American music 
studies. In writings by musicologists 
coming from the “American school,”37 
ancient Greek and Roman musics have 
often been “cleaned up,” celebrated for 
their mathematics, morals, and cosmology 
(in a secular manner), removing them from 
their well-documented (by classicists) 
attachment to sacrifices, processions, and 
religious cults. Alternatively, ancient Greek 
and Roman musics are studied on their 
own terms, mainly by classicists, typically 
at a distance from early Christian music 
or the longue durée history of Western 
music.38 Surprisingly underresearched are 
the efforts of the church fathers to ban 
pagan musics and instruments from the 
church.39 This foundational exclusionism 
of Western music history, indeed the 
whole era of transition from ancient musics 
to Christian dominance, is routinely 
skipped over or barely mentioned in 
music textbooks, and it is virtually absent 
as a scholarly specialization in Anglo-
American music departments.40 It is as 
though those of us who work in Anglo-
American music studies believe that very 
little of interest happened for four or 
five centuries (or more) after the birth 
of Christ (I must admit, I long assumed 
so myself ).41 In my experience, a reason 
often given for this temporal gap is a “lack 
of sources,” so it bears emphasizing that 
there are thousands of texts in Latin and 
Greek (and myriad other languages, like 
Aramaic) that survive from the period. 
Such sources are detailed enough about 
daily life, for example, that they have led 
classicists to study the sounds and smells 
of ancient cities.42 The musicological 
gap here strikes me as akin to scholars of 
(say) thirteenth-century Europe or Asia 
skipping over the Mongols because they 
can’t sympathize with their worldview; 
the problem, I suggest, is that we have 
trouble taking the pagans’ side in the 
story of the emergence of Christian 
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musics. Musicologists who come to this 
early material often do so because they are 
Christian and intend to study the growth 
of that musical tradition (a Strathernian 
doubling). The blame can be spread 
around to include ethnomusicologists’ 
commitment to ethnography and their 
general lack of interest in this subject 
matter, as well as the methodological 
tendency for music scholars studying 
ancient music history to research Christian 
musics qua Christian musics rather than 
their communal encounters with Others. 
The point I want to drive home here is 
that when the fundamental violence of the 
break with pagan ontologies of music is 
not acknowledged, the Christian musical 
ontology appears as something that 
early Christians simply assented to—I 
will describe this below as a Protestant 
ontology of music projected back in 
time—rather than a world-historical 
transformation in what music is that was 
brought about through the disciplining 
efforts of the church fathers and early 
Christian music itself.
I do not have space to consider the 
church fathers’ disciplining of music here in 
much depth. I point readers to two sources: 
Johannes Quasten’s Music and Worship in 
Pagan and Christian Antiquity and James 
McKinnon’s The Temple, the Church Fathers 
and Early Western Chant.43 Both are obscure 
and, in my experience, not discussed 
much (if ever) in Anglo-American music 
departments. Both are old: Quasten’s book 
is based on his 1927 dissertation submitted 
to the Catholic Theology faculty at the 
University of Münster, with the English 
translation (now out of print) appearing 
just in 1983; McKinnon’s book, published 
in 1998, is based on his 1965 dissertation.44 
Quasten’s book begins with several chapters 
on music in Greek and Roman sacrificial 
rituals and cults—here are the opening lines 
of his chapter 1:
The legends and myths of nearly all 
pagan peoples have sought to explain the 
elaborate use of music in their worship 
by indicating that the art of music was a 
gift of the gods to men. . . . According to 
the view which was most widely held, 
it was to the gods themselves that music 
was pleasing. This is how Tibullus, for 
example, interprets the connection 
between music and worship. In keeping 
with this is the explanation Horace gives 
for sacred music when he calls it a means 
of appeasement which, like the fragrance of 
incense and the blood of animals, disposes 
the gods to act favorably toward men.45
Even according to the Christian theologian 
Quasten, then, the foundations of Western 
music history lie not in the theorization of 
scales, or Platonic or Aristotelian notions 
of music and morality, or the harmony of 
the spheres, or chant or polyphony, but in 
music’s use as a gift to the gods: music in 
the earliest moments of Western history is 
fundamentally relational, conceived not as 
an expression of an interior self or identity, 
but as a means to cajole, plead with, and 
appease divine sovereign power. If a retort 
to this claim is that such an ontology is 
a “prehistory” to Western music, that it 
disappeared in the wake of Christianity, 
bears little resemblance to Western music 
history today, and thus does not constitute 
what defines Western music history, we 
must note that you are then defining 
Western music history as founded upon and 
equivalent to the growth of Christianity. 
But this line of thought makes two rather 
extreme assumptions: first, that the shift to 
Christianity was willingly assented to by the 
bulk of the population, and thus was a choice 
that is reflective of a broader civilizational 
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identity; and second, that dissenting voices 
and ontologies did not persist and do not 
also define Western music history over the 
longue durée. 
Now consider how Clement of 
Alexandria (d. ca. 215 c.e.), in his Paidagogos, 
felt “called to take up the struggle against 
the ‘music of idols’”:
When a man occupies his time with 
flutes, stringed instruments, choirs, 
dancing, Egyptian krotala and other 
such improper frivolities, he will find 
that indecency and rudeness are the 
consequences. Such a man creates a din 
with cymbals and tambourines; he rages 
about with instruments of an insane cult. 
. . . Leave the syrinx to shepherds and 
the flute to superstitious devotees who 
rush to serve their idols. We completely 
forbid the use of these instruments at our 
temperate banquet.46
Arnobius (d. 330), in his Adversus nationes, 
“advises the pagans” thus:
You are convinced that the gods are 
pleased and influenced by the sound of 
brass and the blowing of flutes, by horse 
races and games in the theaters and 
that, as a result, the wrath which they 
have conceived at one time or another 
is quelled by such satisfaction. To us 
[Christians] this seems out of place. In 
fact it is incredible that those who far 
transcend every kind of virtue should 
find pleasure and delight in things that 
a reasonable man laughs at and which 
no one appears to enjoy except little 
children or those who have been poorly 
and superficially brought up.47
The polemic goes on and on like this for 
a couple hundred years—the ancient 
sources read not much differently from 
today’s Muslim reformists’ banning of 
instruments (with whom there are indeed 
shared roots in ancient Greek philosophies 
stating that music leads to licentiousness). 
According to McKinnon, early Christians 
blamed poor behavior on instruments and 
their condemnation should not be taken to 
mean they were not performed in the early 
church. By the third and fourth centuries, 
however, due to mass conversions to 
Christianity, instruments became more 
directly associated with pagan rites and 
strictly forbidden on those grounds: 
“Where aulos-players are, there Christ is 
not,” John Chrysostom (d. 407) states.48 
The Christian liturgy was advertised as a 
“sacrifice ‘worthy of God,’ in sharp contrast 
to pagan sacrifice.”49 McKinnon notes that 
“the attitude of opposition to instruments 
was virtually monolithic even though it was 
shared by men of diverse temperaments 
and different regional backgrounds, and 
even though it extended over a span of at 
least two centuries of changing fortunes for 
the Church.”50
Despite such strict proclamations by 
the church fathers, Quasten claims, early 
Christian worshippers resisted giving up 
aspects of pagan musical worship:
The more Christianity expanded among 
the pagans, the more difficult it became to 
hold fast to “adoration in spirit,” as Christ 
had asked for. No longer did it suffice 
merely to offer the people a substitute 
for pagan sacrifice and cultic music . . . 
in the singing of psalms and hymns. 
Now apologists had to work against the 
people’s attraction for customs that they 
had grown to love.51
The struggle was made more difficult 
because “even the Jews, God’s chosen 
people, had made great use of this art [i.e., 
instrumental music] in their liturgy.”52 
Ephraem of Nisbis (d. 373) expressed 
anxiety that worshippers might relapse 
into pagan musics:
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Today, to all appearances, they sing 
psalms as God has ordained, and 
tomorrow they will eagerly dance as 
taught by Satan. . . . Let it be far from 
you that today you listen attentively to 
the reading of the divine Scripture as one 
loving Christ, and that tomorrow you 
listen to lyreplaying as a criminal and a 
hater of Christ.53
Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 390) “had to 
impress continually upon his flock the fact 
that the playing of the tambourine had been 
replaced in Christian liturgy by hymnody, 
while the psalms took the place of other 
songs.”54 In the fourth century there was 
a move against allowing women to sing 
in Christian worship, which Quasten 
suggests was due to their prominence in 
Gnostic rituals.55
Why present the outlines of this violence 
against pagan musics here? I am struck by 
how, through the many years I have spent 
in music departments in the United States 
(and two in the United Kingdom), not 
once have I heard anyone ask about the 
mass ontological transformation in music 
forced by early Christianity, nor question 
the impact this had on the language we 
use to study music today. Meanwhile, the 
language that emerged through Christian 
theology (much of it stemming from 
Judaism)—representation, expression, 
salvation, noneconomy, and so on—is often 
taken as the default assumption about what 
music is, while Western music history—
analyzed through those very concepts—is 
defined precisely as a story about how 
those concepts won out. Regardless of 
one’s valuation of this history, it still seems 
to me that a scholarly discussion on this 
history of suppression should be had, from 
outside of the musicological terms that 
were born by Christianity itself. Yet the only 
two academic books I found on the social 
history of music in this era were published 
long ago and are now out of print. In sum, 
I am not saying no one currently researches 
this (I do, after all, spend a lot of time with 
ethnomusicologists), but in my experience, 
few music scholars specialize in this era, and 
it seems that few of us feel we need to care 
about it.56 
My aim here is not to vilify Christianity 
nor any particular scholar, but rather to point 
this out as an example of secular resonance—
in this case how nominally objective, secular 
scholarship may carry with it a Christian 
bias in how it defines Western music history, 
who the protagonists of that history are, and 
what its operative terminology and ontology 
consist of. I should also stress it is not my 
aim to argue that music needs to be revived 
as an accompaniment to the sacrificing of 
bulls. Rather, I am suggesting that by failing 
to recognize the depth of these struggles 
over the ontology of music within Western 
music history—which would amount 
to admitting that many in the Western 
past resisted what is now the “orthodox” 
ontology of music in the West—“Western 
music history” becomes a story about how 
Christianity worked inclusively in the West, 
in opposition to perceived external Others 
(e.g., Muslims as the boundary with the 
West), rather than an acknowledgment 
that Christianity worked hard to exclude 
internally (i.e., non-Christians in Europe; 
and those deeply Othered by the Christian 
ontology of music, such as drummers).57
As a drummer from the West, I know 
all too well that the “Otherness” the church 
placed on percussion continues to define 
drummers in the West today (consider the 
early drummer joke from Paul the Apostle: 
“If I speak with the tongues of mortals and 
of angels, but do not have love, I am a noisy 
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gong or a clanging cymbal”; Corinthians 
13:1). The hegemony of the voice over 
drumming surely extends to music 
scholarship—I consider this a key secular 
resonance—as though the voice is more 
fundamental to what it means to be human, 
a Judeo-Christian–derived tendency 
reinforced by the fact that music scholars 
these days often grow up in an atmosphere 
that privileges the voice over drumming 
(another secular resonance). The fear of 
drumming’s evident relationality outside 
the bounds of community has always 
appeared to threaten disorder (such as in 
the colonies, whether in the United States, 
where drumming was banned for slaves on 
plantations, or in South Asia, where the 
British regulated processional drumming 
through permits) and of course has long 
been racialized, with characterizations 
of Africans as talented at rhythm and 
drumming in opposition to European 
music defined as melodic and vocal.58
The hegemony of sheet music as the 
premier source for historical musicology 
in that field’s opening decades, particularly 
with regard to the study of early Western 
music, was another key secular resonance 
that is necessary to mention here. The 
problem was not just with the formalistic 
approach it allowed but that the use of 
sheet music (a form of representation) 
to generate scholarly representations of 
music history is a form of “doubling” (in 
the Strathernian sense above) that uses 
a particular object (sheet music) and the 
discourse about music it generated to study 
the growth of music itself as a historical 
phenomenon. I am not suggesting that 
formalism has a genealogical relationship to 
Christian ontology, but rather that it lent a 
veneer of secular objectivity to a method that 
was bound to position Christian musical 
ontology and subjectivity as normative for 
the foundation of Western music. The point 
was registered by Rousseau long ago in his 
On the Origin of Language (1781), which 
Jacques Derrida (in his Of Grammatology) 
sums up thus: “The history of music is 
parallel to the history of language, its 
evil is in essence graphic.”59 Rousseau’s 
complaint was that sheet music facilitated 
greater distance from the tetrachord 
system of ancient Greek music, which he 
romanticized as closer to speech; leaving 
this romanticization aside, I can rephrase 
this to say that early sheet music and its 
doubling in secular music scholarship was 
a key mode through which pagan musical 
ontologies became marked by absence and 
taken to constitute a non-normative aspect 
of the “identity” of Western music history.
Carolyn Abbate’s famous article “Music—
Drastic or Gnostic?” urges musicologists to 
turn to performance (for which, following 
the philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch, she 
uses “drastic” as a shorthand) as opposed 
to a focus on gleaning the meaning of a 
musical work through hermeneutic analysis 
(which, following Jankélévitch, she 
calls “Gnostic”).60 On the one hand, I am 
echoing Abbate here by suggesting music 
scholars need to better recognize how early 
Christian music played this disciplining, 
transformative role (for surely that was 
“drastic”), thus lessening our reliance on 
treating sheet music as a “neutral” source 
that provides a window onto early Christian 
musical meaning (“Gnostic”). On the other 
hand, I named this section after Abbate’s 
article to point out that any online search 
for the term “Gnostics and music” brings 
up her article rather than any study of what 
the actual Gnostics—those stigmatized 
insiders/outsiders to Christianity—did 
with music. Perhaps it is time for music 
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studies to be both drastic and Gnostic, by 
which I mean we need to consider the 
dissenting ontologies of music in the 
West during the period of ascendence for 
orthodox Christianity (and beyond).
Colonialism, Culture, and   
Political Liberalism
Talal Asad’s writings on secularism have 
been vastly influential in the academy 
but underrecognized in music studies. 
Thus it bears mentioning that his famous 
demarcation is between “the secular 
as an ontological-epistemic formation, 
secularism as a political doctrine about the 
separation between religion and politics, 
[and] secularization as simultaneously a 
historical process and a sociological thesis.”61 
As Sabah Mahmood puts it, the secular 
“is not simply the organizing structure 
for what are regularly taken to be a priori 
elements of social organization—public, 
private, political, religious—but a discursive 
operation of power that generates these very 
spheres, establishes their boundaries, and 
suffuses them with content, such that they 
come to acquire a natural quality for those 
living within its terms.”62 Thus far, I have 
been proposing a framework for thinking 
about “the secular” in music studies as “a 
domain of historically constituted and 
variably related behaviors, sensibilities” 
related to (and reproducing) early Christian 
notions of music, experience, personhood, 
community, and discipline through 
nominally secular methodologies like the 
study of early sheet music.63
Asad’s Genealogies of Religion explains 
that the idea that religion has an autonomous 
essence allows us to view it as a transhistorical 
and transcultural phenomenon.64 In 
modernity, he claims, this resulted in the 
assumption that Protestant Christian 
understandings of religion—as based on 
“inner states rather than outward practice,”65 
defined as “a matter of symbolic meanings 
linked to ideas of general order,”66 and as a 
set of beliefs one assents to—are universally 
applicable to all religions. Such a perspective, 
Asad argues, has a Protestant Christian 
history and ignores the role of institutional 
power and discipline, which needs always 
be situated in its unique social and temporal 
context. In light of Asad’s critique, I would 
like to return to my earlier point about the 
persistence of a Christian ontology of music 
and ask whether formations of the secular 
in music studies utilize Protestant Christian 
understandings of music (even when 
studying the distant Christian musical past), 
and if so, how these might differ from the 
early Christian theology of music described 
via Agamben. But before turning to this, I 
want to consider secularism as a political 
phenomenon, because I believe doing so is 
necessary to grasp the ways the Christian 
theology of music in its Protestant guise 
spread globally, including its shaping of 
ethnomusicology.
Sociologist José Casanova argues that 
capitalism and racial exclusions laid the 
foundations for secularism: alongside 1517 
(Martin Luther’s reforms), he believes an 
important date was 1492, both as a signifier 
of the general period in which Jews and 
Muslims were expelled from Spain “to 
create a religiously homogenous realm” 
and “the beginning of European global 
colonial expansion initiated by the Iberian 
monarchies.”67 It was in the wake of all this, 
Casanova writes, that the management of 
new confessions in Europe allowed states 
to increasingly centralize their power. As 
Kenneth Dean and Peter Van der Veer note, 
for Casanova, the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation are best described 
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as creating the conditions for national-
ism through state-controlled religious 
confessionalization processes involving 
ethnic or religious communal “cleans-
ing.” Where adherence to a national (or 
a territorially divided and nationally 
supervised) church was a prerequisite 
to full belonging.68
Through this process, they write, 
“religious imaginings of majoritarian 
belonging [became] crucial to the 
formation of the multiple forms of 
secularity and secularism.”69 Religious 
innovations usually happen in cities; after 
all, “pagan” originally meant “country 
bumpkin,” since the earliest Christians 
were in cities.70 Urbanization does not 
necessarily lead to a drop in religion when 
those from rural areas move to the city and 
become cosmopolitan.71 In many cases the 
result is rather the development of overt 
ethnonationalisms in which urbanized 
elites use religion in the public sphere 
to rewrite a nation’s music history. We 
can see this, for example, in India today, 
where the trend to “Hinduize” Hindustani 
music elides the influences of Others 
(particularly Muslims and the lower 
castes). Even in a comparatively tolerant 
country like Singapore, the notion of 
equality between races (liberalism: each 
must act equally in accordance with the 
law) has pressured communities into 
“rationalized” expressions of religion 
due to the need to maintain orderliness 
in public space, resulting in pressure to 
eradicate practices like trance.72
In this way, the relationship between 
music and secularism becomes a mode of 
communal identity formation that produces 
notions of essential difference between 
ethnic and religious groups. Traditional 
music, now metonymic for community 
and mobilized as a “transhistorical and 
transcultural phenomenon,” serves as 
“proof ” of communal differences and a 
community’s willingness to conform to 
liberal demands for equality. This Protestant 
secularism in “traditional music” resembles 
a Lacanian process of identifying “lack” in 
the Other—those having to rationalize 
their religious musics to conform see a lack 
of concern for the “real” (i.e., efficacious, 
trance-inducing) traditions from the state, 
while those on the side of the state see a lack 
of modernity in the former—and each side 
looks to the law (including state-driven 
discourses on cultural authenticity rooted 
in state funding and nationalist displays 
of culture) to safeguard its rights in virtue 
of having authentic practices. This drives 
an “archive fever” to find and prove the 
authenticity and ancientness of practices.73
This intimate attachment between 
music and identity—the transference of 
music-as-glory and salvation to non-
Christian settings around the globe—
should be understood as emerging from 
the imposition in the colonies of the 
trifecta of political liberalism, secularism, 
and the culture concept. As numerous 
scholars of South Asia have shown, in 
British colonies like India, public space 
became masculinized and assigned as the 
rightful place of the market, while private 
space became feminized and considered 
the domain for formations of culture and 
religion.74 This echoes Charles Taylor’s 
claim that the Protestant revolution, in 
conjunction with the growth of science 
and capitalism, appears to have promoted 
a detachment of religion from public life 
that made religion appear more about 
community and communal values.75 In 
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turn, music could easily be taken as 
representative of a community’s culture 
rather than being efficacious, public, and 
relational; religious processions, in this 
view, are not gifts to gods that plead with 
and cajole them into action but the public 
emergence of a community and its already-
formed culture expressing its identity in 
public. Mahmood puts it this way:
. . . the inescapable quality of secularism 
in part emanates from the structure 
of the modern liberal state, which 
promises to demolish premodern 
forms of hierarchy in order to create a 
polity where all citizens are supposed 
to be formally equal in the eyes of the 
law. This promise, we might recall, 
was linked to a foundational critique of 
ascriptive inequality and a recalibration 
of particularistic forms of belonging. 
The modern political subject had to 
subordinate fealty to his religion, locale, 
and clan to loyalty to the nation-state. 
A key dimension of this transformation 
was the legal and political elaboration 
of the public-private divide, which was 
an important source for elaborating 
other modern distinctions such as 
secular/religious, political/civil, and 
universal/parochial.76
In promising to “demolish premodern 
forms of hierarchy” to produce equality 
under the law, liberalism emerges as 
secularism’s version of Agamben’s second 
paradigm of early Christian political 
theology, since the mandate to accept 
equality requires leaving one’s differences 
behind to be included in a social context 
that claims neutrality but is, in fact, 
transformative and exclusionary.
The result has not been the total 
rationalization and disenchantment of 
music. In many former colonies, the 
anticolonial elites of an earlier generation 
gave way to those invested in efficacious 
ritual practices and religious revivals that 
have merged with ethnonationalists’ uses 
of music-as-identity to drive contemporary 
politics. Certain secularized musics partake 
in the “magical elements of state sovereignty,” 
helping produce the “sacrilized nation” in 
secular form.77 What has resulted, however, 
is a collapsing of cultural practices into a 
relationship with ethnicity that obscures 
their histories of connection between 
Others. This, I contend, is the global legacy 
of the Christian ontology of music-as-
glory, music-as-representation, and music-
as-salvation.78 
In looking at “music and secularism,” 
then, I suggest we need to avoid collapsing 
it into a study of how sacred music 
traditions become disenchanted or hidden 
in private spaces; rather, we should look at 
how the work of secularism, in public spaces, 
institutes “Protestant secular” beliefs 
about the human, God, causality, space 
through the law, capitalist development, 
and “tradition”—the result being that 
cultural practices become “ethnicized” and 
conceptually lacking in “relations” with 
Others. It is precisely this formation of 
the secular that we “double,” I suggest, 
when we write about “music and ethnicity,” 
“music and nationalism,” and the like. My 
point is not that we should refrain from 
studying such topics; rather, I suggest that 
when we presume the naturalness of music-
as-salvation and music-as-noneconomy 
and mobilize it to conceive of what music 
is in relation to identity formation, we 
are producing a secular resonance that 
investigates a formation of the secular from 
within the vocabulary the secular has made 
available to music studies—a language that 
is heavily Christianized in secular form.
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Capitalism and “Protestant Secular” 
Music Studies
Rather than celebrating divine sovereignty, 
music today glorifies the individual (as 
composer, musician, band, listener, or 
community in isolation), while sovereignty 
is equated with a lack of institutional or 
divine control (small government) and 
work ethic (as Weber famously showed). 
Akin to Asad’s critique of Protestant 
secularism (above), music is now a matter 
of lifestyle, rife with symbols that stand for 
what the person or community “assents” 
to, which mediate actions (e.g., long hair, 
rock, free love). Also “Protestant” is that 
the privileging of music as a personal 
choice turns listeners into consumers and 
obscures the disciplining role of music on 
the body by institutions (record labels, high 
schools, venues) and inscriptions (e.g., 
films). Music still glorifies inoperativity 
since it is viewed as a temporary release 
from labor (time off work, when one 
“blows off steam”); even when economic 
success is achieved through music, it 
remains conceptualized as an alternative 
to real labor (not a “normal job”). Thus, 
as with early Christianity, music-as-glory 
continues to serve as a smokescreen for 
its own labor. But now this operates via 
commodity fetishism, since the social labor 
that influenced the compositional process 
(yielding the musical “product”) is obscured 
in favor of the genius-star-sovereign whose 
glory is bestowed by fans and managed by 
bureaucratic figures (the new oikonomia)—
first the conductor, sheet music publisher, 
concert booker, and musicologist; then the 
record company, record producer, music 
video director, and so on; and in our times, 
the solitary electronic musician at her 
laptop who is at once a musician, composer, 
manager, and promoter (the apotheosis of 
neoliberalism). In the neoliberal era, each 
musician is her own oikonomia, dispensing 
and managing her own glory, with the 
necessity of a vigorous work ethic marketed 
by institutions (e.g., websites charging you 
for distribution) as a musician’s personal 
choice to be independent from institutions 
(e.g., record labels). Music as freedom from 
normative work undergirds our notion 
of music as the celebration of human 
achievement and culture, severing music’s 
relationship to our natural environment 
except as aesthetic inspiration (where 
music serves to represent nature or present 
a composer’s feelings toward nature) 
and eliminating the notion that we labor 
through music for others rather than just 
as an expression of ourselves.
Meanwhile, in music studies, this 
Protestant secular musical ontology allows 
for the seeming translatability and mutual 
comprehension of differing conceptions 
of sound, personhood, community, and 
territory, “binding” and “tying” bodies 
and sounds together so that they appear 
in sync like planets in orbit, consumable 
in the classroom today amid a musical 
marketplace dominated by phenomena 
like “the playlist” (secular resonance).79 
As with Asad’s discussion of “religion,” 
the positing of “music” as a universal 
category likewise positions it as having an 
autonomous essence—allowing us to view 
music as a transhistorical and transcultural 
phenomenon—when we look for it in 
particular contexts. Conceived as a neutral 
framework, a search for “music” tends to 
utilize the Protestant secular understanding 
of it as lifestyle when discussing an 
individual or musical product in the 
capitalist marketplace, while the communal, 
ethnicized framework (described in the 
prior section) is used for “traditional” and 
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“classical” musics around the world but 
excludes the Western classical canon.
Between these poles of the individual 
and community, curiously, lies the Western 
classical canon as formulated by some 
long-canonized musicologists, of whom 
I’ll name Carl Dahlhaus as a preeminent 
example. The idea of relation emerged for 
such scholars as internally valid through 
highlighting (some might say fetishizing) 
the listener-music-transcendence relation
—a Christian extrapolation if there ever was 
one (as some of them admit). Once again, 
music-as-glory presents itself as welcoming 
and inclusive but excludes any perspective 
that might claim external relations. This 
ideological opposition to the social—
the idea that recognizing the social is a 
bastardization of the music which, though 
nominally secular, is treated as an object 
that must not be profaned—was perhaps 
most infamously expressed by Charles 
Rosen in the hostility he showed toward 
Tia DeNora for her sociological study of 
Beethoven’s genius.80 Viewed as potentially 
debased by the market and linked to ethnic 
identity only by reference to the Volk who 
could be referenced within the abstracted 
work, the pretense to secularism (in 
scholarship on the canon and the canon 
itself ) greatly loosened as scholars (of that 
era) became enthralled with how Western 
classical music produces Christianity from 
within the supposedly secular space of 
its performance—what has been termed 
“secular enchantment.” Consider Dahlhaus’s 
statement that “even Beethoven’s 
symphonies [became] ‘religious’ music, 
since they represent an evolutionary stage 
at which the ‘ever-drifting World Spirit’ has 
transmuted clearly the defined Christian 
beliefs into previsions of the ‘marvels of a 
distant realm.’”81
It is a sign of how far we have come that 
Abigail Fine (in this special issue of the 
Yale Journal of Music and Religion) locates 
the roots of Dahlhaus’s (and the canon’s) 
secular enchantment rather than simply 
using it as her mode of analysis: 
The politics of canon formation mirror 
secularity because canons emerged at 
the intersection of sacred and secular, 
through a constellation of practices 
known as Kunstreligion, or art-religion. 
In the nineteenth century, cultural 
heroes like Bach, Beethoven, and Mozart 
became surrogate saints for the liberal 
elite, for whom Bildung was grounded 
in an amalgam of religious practices: 
Catholic sainthood, Lutheran Pietism, 
and Jewish educational ambition, all 
latent behind the smokescreen of secular 
self-improvement.
No longer a smokescreen for divine 
inoperativity, music became “the smoke-
screen of secular self-improvement,” taking 
on many of religion’s material components. 
The term Kunstreligion (art-religion), 
Fine says,
refers to a set of concepts at the 
intersection of German Romantic 
philosophical idealism, Catholic revival, 
and a growing interest in Eastern 
religions in the early nineteenth century. 
Its roots in musical thought have been 
traced to early Romantic writers like 
Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder and 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, who sacralized 
the listening experience as a form of 
devotion and likened religious feelings 
to a “holy music” (heilige Musik) that 
should accompany secular life.
Fine shows that some Jewish intellectuals 
hid their roots and conformed, while 
others rebelled against the “Christian 
secularism” of the canon by adopting 
Marxism—“a satisfying surrogate for 
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national consciousness” since it appreciated 
“the collectivity of human achievement by 
Jews and non-Jews alike.” The struggles of 
Jewish composers and critics to assimilate to 
the secular canon’s Christian underpinnings, 
Fine argues, demonstrates that Bildung failed 
to offer the secular space it promised. The 
same process of exclusion through inclusion 
identified above in the erasure of the pagans 
and Gnostics from music history, and 
through the imposition of secularism and 
liberalism in the colonies (and of course also 
missionization), thus happened similarly in 
Europe at the heart of the classical music 
canon through the assimilation or exclusion 
it mandated of Jews. The message of the 
Western ontology of music seems always to 
be: you can join us, but only if you listen 
(and think) as we do.
The Special Issue
The six essays in this special issue mark a 
turning point in music studies’ engagement 
with secularism because they refuse the 
types of facile secular resonance described 
above. More important, they demonstrate 
how musicians are combating the exclusions 
of Christianized secularism as it dominates 
various public spheres, particularly in 
tandem with neoliberal capitalism. 82
Braxton Shelley’s essay considers Rev. Dr. 
William Barber’s role in the “fusion politics” 
of the North Carolina-based Moral Mondays 
movement, through which he aimed to 
produce “higher ground” following the 
enactment of Tea Party–influenced policies 
by the state’s Republican legislature, which 
gained control of both branches of state 
government in 2010 and the governorship 
in 2012. Speaking at largescale protests, 
including the 2014 Historic Thousands 
on Jones Street March, when 85,000 
people gathered, Barber problematized 
the boundaries between the sacred and 
secular through his use of “Blackpentecostal 
breath”83—“jeremiads” that are situated 
“at the intersection of political speech and 
ecstatic sermon.” In Barber’s performances, 
sounds that are highly characteristic of black 
sacred rhetoric are recruited to “critique 
the oppression wrought by contemporary 
social orders.” What I am interested in here 
is how Barber’s refusal of secularism is a 
refusal of the secular resonance between the 
ethics of neoliberal capitalism and white, 
conservative, evangelicalism that positions 
itself as embattled but actually dominates 
the “neutral” public sphere:
By claiming that various features of a 
governing program are immoral, Barber 
seeks to deny the system the legitimacy 
on which it depends, suggesting that this 
interruption is the most effective affront 
to the extant structure. As he names 
protest in these moral terms, Barber 
aims to invalidate the injustices that are 
naturalized by market capitalism, the 
persistent inequity that is explained away 
as evidence of personal irresponsibility, 
asserting that there is also a public 
responsibility. If neoliberalism is a 
political theology, then it is differently 
vulnerable to theological critique. 
Reverend Barber produces an inclusive 
universalism akin to the second paradigm of 
early Christian political theology outlined at 
the start of this essay—a radical relationality 
necessary for social justice.
In Andrew Mall’s essay, liberal, white 
Christians come together to combat the 
toxic mix of neoliberal and conservative 
evangelical hegemony. The Beer & Hymns 
movement—which fosters community 
through the singing of Christian hymns 
in bars and festival settings—allows for 
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those who left the church to engage in 
their nostalgia for hymnody and childhood, 
while calling on others who simply enjoy 
hymns to gain a sense of togetherness in 
the wake of neoliberal isolation. The event 
brings Christian singing into public space, 
but it also somewhat divests Christianity 
from hymnody by situating it in a secular 
setting. Here the theology of music-as-
salvation remains but has been transferred 
to “Protestant secular” notions of the 
self and community. Though less overtly 
political than Barber’s jeremiads, the Beer 
& Hymns movement also challenges the 
secular resonance between neoliberalism 
and evangelicalism by aiming to be “as 
welcoming as possible, and in doing so to 
recognize that faith identities are multivalent 
and problematic, and that no matter your 
religious beliefs, baggage, or lack thereof, 
singing hymns can be fun.” Here Christian 
music becomes a welcoming “secular” public 
expression of the longing for relationality 
that, ironically, refuses the Christian 
absolutism dominating the “secular” public 
sphere in the United States.
Shobana Shankar’s essay explores how 
Hindus in Ghana have responded sonically 
to Christianity’s dominance in Ghana’s 
public sphere. Though Ghana is a secular 
state and safeguards the right for people 
to join different religions, Pentecostal 
Christians have had a large influence on 
defining religiosity in the public sphere, and 
according to Shankar they tend to look down 
on Ghanaian Hindus as idol worshippers. 
Hinduism is positioned by its Ghanaian 
practitioners as a return to “tradition” that 
liberates some senses Christianity has kept 
down, though Ghanaian Hindus have 
reshaped certain mantras in the wake of 
Christian influence, adopting some musical 
practices not found in India. This is the third 
example in this special issue of how secular 
public space is dominated by a hostile 
and conservative evangelical Christianity, 
leading to particular compromises and 
refusals by those who think otherwise.
In Oksana Nesterenko’s essay, these 
dynamics are reversed: in the former Soviet 
Union, the government and public sphere 
were defined by atheism and so Catholicism 
came to signify a radical otherness that 
signified the possibility for freedom, 
relationality, and community. In the 1970s, 
composers like Alfred Schnittke, Sofia 
Gubaidulina, and Arvo Pärt turned toward 
Christianity, a move that happened, as one 
pianist of the era quipped, because “the 
flavor of life forced everyone to go to church.” 
Nesterenko highlights the emergence of 
a theme that has productively dominated 
discussions of secularism in music studies, 
“secular enchantment,” and, through the 
music of Vyacheslav Artyomov, an attempt 
to revive religion in public spaces in the 
wake of state atheism.84
What appears at stake in these essays 
is oppression rather than religion per se: 
whatever exclusions come to dominate 
the public sphere call forth sonic protests 
for inclusion and respect for difference. 
Religious musics become vessels, or 
perhaps I should say efficacious offerings, 
that have the potential to produce social 
justice through relationality outside the 
bounds of community.
Conclusion: From “The Other” to   
“The Otherwise”
While I have been critical of secular 
resonance throughout this article, adopting 
the normative, Christianized, secular 
musicological language is not always 
misplaced, and in fact is often impossible 
to move beyond for good reason. This 
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is because secular resonance in many 
places has become something like what 
Mauss called a “total social fact” and thus 
created the conditions many of us study. 
For example, if we are able to trace a line 
from certain anticolonial and postcolonial 
constructions of music as national culture 
in newly independent states to colonized 
intellectuals whose notions of culture 
have a clear genealogical relationship to 
the Herderian paradigm of folk music 
as communal and national expression 
(Herder was a Lutheran pastor), it follows 
that scholarship on those postcolonial 
traditions may need to utilize concepts that 
emerged from and reproduce the inherited 
Christian musical ontology in secular 
form that they are being used to analyze. 
But this does have the effect of making 
our Christianized, secular musicological 
concepts—which today have an astounding 
global ubiquity—appear to be what music 
is in nature, a tendency that is of course 
another secular resonance. 
Secular resonance becomes more 
noticeable and important to flag as a tendency 
to avoid when one is doing research with 
communities that have not been shaped by 
it. Thus it is not so easy to ask, has music 
studies moved beyond secular resonance or 
does secular music studies remain a “fugitive 
way for [Christian] religion to survive”?85 
What is more appropriate, to my mind, is to 
ask, have we learned how to move beyond 
secular resonance for those contexts when 
our inherited Christian musical ontology 
is inappropriate? I believe we have indeed 
made significant improvements, though 
a discussion is outside the bounds of this 
article. Suffice it to say here that despite 
the rather polemical tone of this article, 
I acknowledge that music scholars of 
all stripes have been chipping away for 
decades to make available the perspective 
on secular resonance that I present here 
(which is not to say they would agree with 
all my assumptions and formulations). 
Some noteworthy examples, to name a few 
stretched out over the past few decades, 
include Philip Bohlman’s historicization of 
Herder’s identity paradigm; Georgina Born’s 
mobilization of Alfred Gell’s anthropology 
of art in a music studies framework, which 
treats art objects as having agency on the 
viewer; Tamara Levitz’s convening of the 
“Musicology Beyond Borders?” colloquy 
in a special issue of JAMS that she edited; 
and Ana Maria Ochoa Gautier’s work on 
ontological difference in colonial Colombia. 
Each of these works helps us move beyond 
secular resonance, even if they do not use 
that term.86
I should also be careful to avoid my own 
secular resonance by unwittingly attributing 
to the Christian secular ontology a global 
dominance that it does not have. Many 
countries in the world are not secular, and 
in many societies where secularism is state 
policy, many sounds and musics remain 
largely untouched by secularization. There 
are also places where Christianity is not 
dominant in state-driven secularism (for 
example, the imposition of the Islamic 
conceptualization of God on Balinese 
Hindus by the constitutionally secular 
Indonesian state).87 Lauren Osborne shows 
in her essay in this issue that Christianized 
secularism is not a force that positions 
qur’anic recitation in Oman. Her study 
highlights the bureaucratic, governmental, 
and economic (i.e., cultural differences 
in how sound plays a role in any given 
ordering, “domestic and not political in a 
strict sense—of both divine and human 
life”).88 Rather than the transformation 
of religion, Osborne shows that, on the 
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one hand, technologies like the internet 
are tools through which the Omani state 
promotes traditional ways of reciting and 
memorizing the Qur’an. On the other hand, 
the modern state is “secular” (the official 
place of Islam in Oman notwithstanding). 
Religion here again adopts the mantle of 
“culture” and is presumed to be an important 
component of Omani identity, history, and 
heritage. Religion and secularism are thus 
not naturally opposed. Rather, the secular 
state and new technologies in Oman become 
means through which religion is at once 
newly situated and traditionally reinforced 
through governmentality.
These are important points for scholars 
of music to keep in mind as we increasingly 
turn to sound studies: for, as Jonathan 
Sterne famously showed, the West’s “audio-
visual litany” is of Christian heritage.89 This 
ordering of the senses “idealizes hearing 
(and, by extension, speech) as manifesting 
a kind of pure interiority. It alternately 
denigrates and elevates vision: as a fallen 
sense, vision takes us out of the world. But 
it also bathes us in the clear light of reason.”90 
This is a “metaphysics of presence” that, 
Robin James notes, “we get from Plato 
and Christianity: sound and speech offer 
the fullness and immediacy that vision and 
words deny.”91 But when scholars turn to 
sound but retain the idea that it produces 
immediacy and is necessarily opposed to 
vision, she notes, they actually double 
down on what the discourse on sound is 
intended to supplant: the hegemony of 
Christian framings of the senses—which is 
to say, they produce secular resonance. As 
Elizabeth Povinelli puts it, in terms that 
echo my description of secular resonance, 
“What is initially dispersed noise comes to 
enclose itself through self-reference (and 
thus an initial this-that differentiation), 
creating its differential qualities and 
skin, and, in the process, pulling in 
and altering that which surrounds it.”92 
Following Povinelli, I suggest we might 
strive to move beyond “the Other” per 
se in music studies—beyond thinking 
that what is needed for equity in music 
studies is simply a greater representation 
of difference according to the terms of our 
Christianized secular ontology—and move 
toward a better respect for what Povinelli 
calls “the Otherwise.” This would amount 
to being more careful about inadvertently 
forcing the Otherwise through the sieve 
of the audio-visual litany, but it will also 
require avoiding what Povinelli calls “the 
cunning of recognition”—the tendency 
for liberal multiculturalism to require 
minority groups (such as in courts of 
law) to act traditionally.93 In other words, 
moving beyond secular resonance is not 
a process of naming authentic traditions 
that are seemingly beyond the grasp of 
modernity, for doing so has long been the 
task of ethnonationalist movements that, 
paradoxically, appropriate such traditions 
through the colonial-derived framework 
described above (and thus their own 
secular resonance).
In sum, just as ecomusicology 
reinforces a boundary between nature 
and culture when writers demarcate a 
seemingly enclosed concept of “nature” 
there for study (as Ana Maria Ochoa 
Gautier has argued),94 positing religion 
in music studies as “a distinctive space of 
human practice and belief which cannot be 
reduced to any other” is a formation of the 
secular.95 In saying this I mean no ill will 
toward this journal; rather, my aim is to 
issue a warning for scholars of music who 
think the topic of secularism is irrelevant 
for their research if they do not study 
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religious musics. To sequester the study of 
secularism and music in journals of “music 
and religion” would be another secular 
resonance. Furthermore, when we position 
Christian musics (vis-à-vis the public and 
private spheres) as the ground level for 
our investigation of music and secularism—
as I suggest we tend to do—we position 
what is actually a globally specific case for 
thinking about music and secularism as the 
norm. Christianity is unique for the study 
of “music and secularism” because the 
religion’s notions of salvation, glory, and 
representation already define the normative 
secular ontology of music, so what emerges 
from such studies is an emphasis on the 
public/private placement of religion rather 
than the misrepresentation and elimination 
of ontological difference that occur when 
the normative secular ontology is applied 
to non-Christians. This hiding of the 
transformative power of Christian-derived 
concepts of music studies that occurs 
through their doubling—even when “music 
and secularism” is the topic of study—is of 
course another secular resonance, a binding 
and tying effect that, over a long period 
(saeculum), transforms difference.
A more interesting question than 
Agamben’s that leads off this essay—why 
does power need glory?—is to my mind its 
opposite: why does glory need power? The 
secularization of music and music studies 
removes music from the formal/societal 
institutions that gave it power in order to 
position music-as-representation as the 
will of a sovereign individual (musician, 
composer, listener) removed from social 
obligations. In some cases, such as when 
music-as-culture works to eliminate caste 
discrimination in India, this can be a good 
thing.96 But too often around the world, I 
suggest, musical labor loses its value as part 
of an ordering economy or oikonomia and 
becomes valued merely as the production 
of a self seemingly removed from relations 
to Others. Power comes from relationships; 
the British queen is nothing without her 
subjects. Once conceptually removed 
from the production of political and 
social power—viewed as being situated 
in relation to politics and in an economy 
rather than always already being a political 
economy—music is reshaped into what it 
is not in nature: merely representative and 
not causal.
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